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This paper examines deficiencies in the trial of Japanese 
war criminals after World War Two. The judges on the bench 
and the procedures used in the trial were biased against the 
Japanese defendants. The law on the subject was interpreted 
by the victor nations with no debate possible from the defense. 
There were also notable omissions from the list of people 
indicted. These factors resulted in the punishment of the 
Japanese but not in justice. 
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Injustice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial 
For an American, the right to a fair trial is one of the 
many constitutional safeguards that is taken for granted. This 
guarantee was not a luxury possessed by the accused Japanese 
at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), 
a tribunal convened to judge the actions of twenty-eight 
defendants in the war in the Pacific from 1931 to 1945. 
At the start of the trial, the Tribunal and the Allies, 
who took it upon themselves to organize the trial, were lauded 
for their impoartial and noble effort at providing a fair trial 
for the defendants. This spirit was, of course, with the 
expectation that a verdict of guilty on all charges would be 
the certain outcome. According to the chief prosecutor, Joseph 
Keenan, the verdict of the trial was less important than the 
trial proceedings themselve. He says: 
• • • but the prosecution never lost sight of the 
fact that the goal of punishing the accused was 
relatively unimportant, when compared with the grander 
and wider aim of the trial, i.e. to advance the cause 
of peace and right notions of international law. 1 
It can already be see by Keenan's statement that it WAS important 
to punish the Japanese, else how would the "cause of peace" 
have been advanced? This goal could not have been accomplished 
by acquitting the Japanese on all counts. In the same train 
of thought, when the question of a fair trial arose, Keenan 
underscored the fact that the punishment of the guilty is more 
important than a fair trial for others who might be guilty. 
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It was more just to try the present group of 
defendants, despite the possibility of an unintended 
miscarriage of justice in the case of one or several, 
rather than not to try any of them in a judicial 
proceeding of this nature. Had there been an actual 
miscarriage of justice with regard to some of the 
defendants, there would have been no wrong, because 
it would have been only incidental to the main purpose, 
namely the punishment of the guilty, and because every 
reasonable precaution was taken to insure a fair trial 
for all of the accused. 2 
with this skewed idea of justice, the Tribunal proceeded in 
a dubious direction. 
Despite the facade of justice and fairness, the trial was 
not fair and was clearly stacked against the defendants. This 
was demonstrated by several aspects of the trial. The choice 
of justices was biased and very partial to the prosecution. 
The rules of the Tribunal were most beneficial to the 
prosecution. There were porminent Japanese that should have 
been in the dock, but were excluded. Time and physical 
considerations severely limited the defense's case. The 
interpretation of international law was made so that Japan's 
actions were considered illegal. Aggressive war was deemed 
illegal and the defense's arguments against this werE~ dismissed. 
There was no precedent for trying individuals for acts of state. 
Finally, only acts of the Japanese were under the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal. 
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The discrepancies in the trial will be examined in further 
detail. As they are, it will be clear that an injustice was 
done at the Tribunal. It should not be said that Japanese 
aggression was "justified," but that the Allies did not deal 
fairly when judging the actions of the Japanese. 
The best place to start is with the foundation of the 
Tribunal, the justices. In most courts the impartiality of 
the judge and jury, duties which in this case were both carried 
out by the eleven justices, is the highest concern. Apparently 
in what President of the Tribunal Sir William Webb considered 
3 
one of the most important trials of the century , that tenet 
of law was not obeserved. The composition of the Tribunal 
clearly gave some doubt as to the impartiality of the 
proceedings. 
There was only one justice on the Tribunal that had any 
experience in international law. That was Justice Radhabinod 
Pal from India. All of the justices held high court positions 
in their respective countries, and some were even on the highest 
courts in their land, yet Pal was also elected one of the joint 
presidents of the International Law Association before the war, 
which gave him some credibility in international dealings. 4 
No other justice had any notable experience in international 
law. 
The fact that most of the justices had no international 
experience was a small factor when considering the bias of the 
Tribunal. ALL of the justices were from the nations of the 
victorious Allies. There were no justices from neutral countries 
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or equal representation of the losers, the Japanese. Keenan 
addressed these two propositions when defending the impartiality 
of the Tribunal. Considering judges from neutral countries, 
he simply stated that they mayor may not have been impartial 
and beneficial to the trial. He also rationalized the situation 
by arguing that the Japanese submitted to the Tribunal by signing 
the surrender document. As it was, judges from neutral countries 
would have been equally impartial, and probably more impartial 
than the judges on the bench. As for the possibility of one 
or more representatives on the court from Japan, he stated that 
it would not be possible to find an impartial justice from Japan. 
He said that despite the fact that a Japanese justice could 
have been found that was against the war and did not participate, 
that justice would have a subconscious tendency to give leniency 
to the defendants simply because they were fellow countrymen 
who were serving their country.5 Questions then surface about 
the justices from the Allied countries. Would not they also 
have subconscious tendencies, but against the defendants, since 
their own countrymen were killed in battle? Presumably, the 
good-intentioned Allied appointees were superior to the Japanese 
in that respect. 
Not only were all the justices from victor nations, a few 
of the justices had, to varying degrees, conflicts of interest. 
The most obvious of those was Justice Delfin Jaranilla of the 
Philippines. Jaranilla was a colonel in the Philippine army. 
While serving in the Philippines, he was captured and later 
was part of the infamous Bataan Death March. 6 It cannot be 
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possible that Jaranilla was an impartial judge, consciously 
or unconsciouly. In fact, Jaranilla wrote a concurring opinion 
along with the majority judgment which stated that he thought 
the penalties were too light and he would have strengthened 
some sentences of the accused. 7 
There were other justices besides Jaranilla that served 
in their countries militaries. Major General Myron Cramer, 
Major General I.M. Zarayanov, and Harvey Northcroft, who were 
from the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and New Zealand respectively, held 
positions in their armed forces. 8 After serving in an 
organization which held the Japanese as enemies and criminals 
and whose purpose was to wipe them out or push them back, 
impartiality would be hard to ensure. 
Of more serious concern, two justices had worked in the 
prosecution of war criminals before they sat on the bench at 
Tokyo. Sir William Webb, the Australian justice, was the chief 
investigator of Japanese war atrocities committed against 
Australian troops. General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers under whose jurisdiction the 
Tribunal fell, was notified of that fact yet decided that it 
should not disqualify Webb from the Tribunal. Henri Bernard 
of France was the chief prosecutor of Nazi war criminals in 
Paris after the liberation of France. 9 Judging from this 
evidence, the Tribunal does not seem as impartial as it was 
first purported to be. The character of the justices on the 
Tribunal, with the exception of Jaranilla, may not have doomed 
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the defendants at the outset of the trial, but it certainly 
gave the prosecution a very favorable bench to work with. 
The rules of the trial were also beneficial to the 
prosecution. In Article 13a, the Charter for the Tribunal 
ordered the justices to "adopt and apply to the greatest possible 
extent expeditious and non-technical procedure" admitted "any 
evidence which it deems to have probative value.,,10 The Tribunal 
was afforded great leeway due to this rule, since the bench 
was the sole arbiter of whether the evidence was pertinent. 
The Charter also stated in Article 13c(4) that "a diary, letter 
or other document" including "unsworn statements" were admissable 
if the Tribunal thought they contained "information relating 
1 1 to the charges." 
The environment for the trial severely handicapped the 
defense, since it allowed the admission of hearsay evidence. 
The Tribunal allowed testimony or statements to be entered as 
evidence even if the witness did not see in person the event 
he or she was testifying about. The rule on admissibility was 
especially harmful with respect to the admission of diaries. 
The Harada-Saionji memoirs were a crucial piece of evidence 
for the prosecution, yet a considerable amount of that document 
was not first-person knowledge of the writer. In many of the 
entries, Baron Harada was not present at the meetings that were 
recorded in the memoirs. Also, several of the entries were 
recorded long after they occurred, some as long as two months. 12 
Even the contents of the document that Baron Harada 
witnessed personally were confusing and garbled. Harada's 
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stenographer took notes in shorthand as Harada dictated them 
to her. She then transcribed them into Japanese and gave them 
to Harada to correct. She testified that it was difficult to 
tell who was "the subject of the sentence and it was also 
difficult to tell who was saying what," but she did the best 
she could and wrote it how she thought it should be. 13 The 
defense objected to the admission of this evidence on several 
grounds including the stenographer's difficulty in transcribing 
the memoir, its hearsay nature, its use of rumor and opinions, 
and the fact that Harada was not present for several entries 
of the memoir. The Tribunal dismissed those objections and 
entered portions of the memoir into evidence. 14 
Several other instances of admitting hearsay evidence into 
court took place throughout the trial. An affidavit from a 
Mr. Morishima was objected to because the witness did not 
restrict himself to the facts, but stated opinions and theories. 
Webb acknowledged, "It certainly should not be in that form 
but I am afraid we will have to receive it for what probative 
value it has.,,15 When another document was objected to for 
lack of a date of origin, the Tribunal ruled that "the probative 
value of a document will have to be considered when we come 
to review the whole of the evidence.,,16 
In other instances, the prosecution was afforded a different 
interpretation of the rules of admissibility than the defense. 
On June 29, 1946, the defense asked a witness a question about 
a document that had not yet been admitted into evidence. The 
Tribunal held that the document could not be used unless admitted 
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into evidence at least twenty-four hours earlier. Later in 
the trial, however, the prosecution did the same thing and the 
Tribunal allowed it on the grounds that "the very essence of 
the cross-examination" was "the element of surprise.,,17 This 
ruling also allowed the prosecution to admit the Harada-Saionji 
memoirs after the defense had presented its case. Normally, 
only evidence that had been discovered since the prosecution 
closed its case would be admitted at that point, but the Tribunal 
allowed it to be entered as evidence even though the prosecution 
had possession of the memoir from the beginning of the trial. 
With the Tribunal allowing for the surprise factor, the 
defense had very little time to prepare a rebuttal due to the 
massive amount of material that it had to sort through already. 
The defense started in a hole from the first day the indictment 
was read. The prosecution was able to gather evidence for its 
case soon after the formal surrender on September 2, 1945. 
The defense was hampered by only being on the case from 
May 17, 1946, which was a mere two weeks before the prosecution's 
opening statement. To make the situation worse, the prosecution 
had one hundred two translators while the defense was only 
provided with three. A 34:1 ratio was not remotely fair. 
Defense attorney Floyd Mattice summed up the situation: 
We find that when we talk to Japanese counsel, or 
through an interpreter to defendants that far more 
time than the usual time is required. • • • We find 
that when we go to the various offices to be, what 
it seems to be known in military circles as 
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"processed," it takes about four times as much time 
as it takes back in our country to do a similar 
th ' 18 lng. 
The defense did not even receive the services of secretaries 
and stenographers until the first week in June 1946. 
Also, due to considerations of time and limited supplies, 
the prosecution and defense were not required to give full copies 
of all interrogations, diaries, statements, etc. to the the 
opposite parties. This was a necessity because of the sheer 
volume of the evidence presented--the official proceedings were 
more than forty-five thousand pages long--but this also offered 
the chance for both sides to obscure relevant evidence. Since 
the prosecution held or had access to most of the evidence, 
they stood to benefit most from that situation. The defense 
even argued that the prosecution was intentionally holding 
19 
relevant documents, but that notion was rebuked by Webb. 
There were also many witnesses who testified in affidavit 
form without having to confront the accused. To this defense 
attorney Franklin Warren complained: 
Sir, I know of no foundation in law, I know of no 
precedent ever having been set which would require 
an accused to cross-examine a living person upon an 
affidavit which he previously made under the 
supervision, under the entire control, of the 
prosecution but without a single member of the defense 
20 being present. 
Once again the defense was overruled. 
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The most glaring abuse of the affidavit ruling was by the 
Soviet prosecutors. They submitted several affidavits from 
witnesses that were "dead, were in custody in MOscow, or were 
'too ill' to travel to Tokyo," giving the defense no chance 
for cross-examination. When the defense informed the Tribunal 
that Grigori Semyonov had been executed within the last three 
weeks, the Soviet prosecutor waved aside the observation, "In 
what way the fact that the man had been hanged can attack his 
credibility is for the tribunal to object, but I don't think 
that it can be an obstacle to the admission of this affidavit." 21 
After another witness which testified by affidavit was found 
to have been executed by the Soviets, Ben Blakely erupted, "We 
wish to enter our strong protest to the second example of a 
deliberate removal of a witness whose testimony was known to 
be material here," and he went on to call into question the 
idea of a fair trial for the defendants. 22 
The sentiments of Pal were that these affidavits should 
not have been used. 
At present I am thinking of that brand of the rule 
according to which a specific person must be called 
to the stand, or his assertion will not be taken as 
evidence. Such an assertion is not to be credited 
or received as evidence however much the asserter 
may know, unless he is called and deposes on the stand. 
WE DID NOT OBSERVE THIS RULE. 23 
The rules of the Charter had already decided this question for 
the Tribunal and the justices were bound to uphold it. 
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Justices could also leave the trial for any amount of time, 
if the need arose, which it did on many occasions. The only 
stipulation was that a justice should excuse himself from the 
trial if he felt that he had missed enough of the trial to 
t h " d" " I 24 warran 1S 1sm1ssa. This procedure definitely hindered 
the administering of a fair trial. The justices could miss 
important information in the case, since there was such a mass 
of evidence being submitted each day, yet still sit on the bench 
with no repercussion or system for removal from an arbitrary 
source. No judge would dismiss himself from a case of this 
magnitude, either. 
Another alarming shortcoming of the trial was the omission 
of notable defendants. The most obvious of these omissions 
was Emperor Hirohito. To say that the emperor was strictly 
off limits was an understatement. It seemed as if the one thing 
in common between the prosecutors and the defendants was that 
neither wanted to have any questions brought up about the 
emperor. 
The defendants' motives in not bringing the emperor into 
the trial were simply their loyalty to him and Japan. In Japan, 
the emperor was revered as a deity. In theory, his commands 
were the ultimate authority in Japan. Until his historic radio 
announcement calling for the end of the war, only a very select 
few had ever heard him speak. When questions delved into the 
participation of the emperor in the planning of the war, the 
defendants quickly denied any responsibility of the emperor. 
In Tojo's testimony, he claimed full responsibility for the 
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Pacific War and claimed that it was "absolutely not the 
responsibility of the emperor.,,25 The next day, Tojo was 
commended by the Japanese people for absolving the emperor, 
and most were relieved that the emperor would not be involved 
in the trial. 
The Allied prosecutors also did not want Hirohito brought 
into the trial as a witness or a defendant. The peace in 
occupied Japan was at stake. A couple of the nations represented 
in the trial made objections to the United states, but General 
MacArthur had received orders from Washington that no action 
would be taken against the emperor. The consequences of angering 
a nation that had recently been devastated in a war by taking 
away their reigning deity and ruler was too much of a risk to 
pursue an indictment. At one point after the surrender, Hirohito 
appeared before MacArthur and offered to take full responsibility 
for all of the actions taken by the Japanese in the period 
covered by the indictment. MacArthur could not go against the 
orders of Washinton, though, and the emperor was denied his 
26 
request. 
During the course of the trial, evidence arose that told 
of tests of chemical and germ warfare on prisoners of war in 
Manchuria, but none of the persons responsible for these terrible 
acts were indicted. When a document detailing the tE!sting of 
bacteriological weapons was inadvertently admitted into court, 
then soon forgotten by the prosecution, Webb incredulously asked 
if further evidence would be entered on that shocking subject. 
The prosecution quickly squelched this line of questioning and 
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said no more evidence would be introduced on the subject and 
no further mention was made of that facet of the war. Later, 
it was found out that the people in charge of these operations 
were given immunity if they divulged their secrets to the u.s. 
In 1982, Justice B.V. Roling of the Netherlands commented on 
the cover-up: 
As one of the judges in the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, it is a bitter experience 
for me to be informed now that centrally ordered 
Japanese war crininality of the most disgusting kind 
was kept secret from the Court by the u.s. 
27 government. 
No member of the Kempeitai or zaibatsu was put on trial, 
either. The Kepeitai was the secret police of Japan during 
the war and was similar to the Gestapo in Germany. The omission 
of anyone from the Kempeitai was presumably so secret documents, 
covering mostly biological technology, would not have to be 
made public. The zaibatsu were the financiers and industrialists 
that wholeheartedly supported the war since it was making them 
rich. The absence of any businessmen at the trial was 
particularly maddening to the Soviet Union which blamed 
capitalism and fascism for most problems in the world. The 
zaibatsu were left out so that there would be a good economic 
base to start rebuilding the country. Building up the 
capitalists in the country would also combat any possible 
communist feelings that were building in Japan. 28 
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Another person to escape trial was originally indicted 
by the Tribunal. Dr. Shumei Okawa was among the twenty-eight 
defendants slated for trial until he made a scene in the 
courtroom. He underwent psychiatric testing and was deemed 
unfit for trial by a committee of psychiatrists, the only 
dissenting vote being from the Japanese psychiatrist who thought 
Okawa might be faking it. After a year, Okawas's hallucinations 
deserted him and he seemed in his right mind. He was examined 
again, but no copy of that exam was ever found. He stayed in 
an asylum until the trial was over. His attorneys then asked 
General MacArthur if any further action was going to be taken 
against Okawa. MacArthur was glad that the trial was behind 
him and told Okawa's attorneys that the charges against Okawa 
29 had been dropped. A week after Tojo was hanged, Okawa was 
released. One of Japan's most influential war hawks had gotten 
off without even having to sit through the trial. 
These example just show the contradiction between what 
was said and what was done by the Allies, though the Potsdam 
Declaration stated that "stern justice shall be meted out to 
all war criminals. Obviously, the Allies selected 
a few notable Japanese so that they could make a historic 
statement. 
Just as the justices and procedures were biased against 
the defendants, the interpretation of international law at the 
time was also bent against the accused. The defense held that 
the laws against aggressive war, whether written or customary, 
were not present at the time. It also argued that individuals 
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could not be held responsible for acts of state. The majority 
of the Tribunal felt the opposite was true, while only Justice 
31 Pal agreed with the defense. 
International law as understood and proclaimed by the Allies 
was written into the Charter of the Tribunal. The Charter 
stated, "Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared 
war of aggression •••• ,,32 So the Tribunal, which was bound 
by the Charter, was already obligated to treat aggressive war 
as a crime depite the arguments of the defense. This was yet 
another inequity of the trial. 
The first problem of the prosecution was defining aggressive 
war without simply stating that aggressive war was the Japanese 
attacks on Manchuria, China, Pearl Harbor, and Singapore. In 
1936 at a conference in Paris, the International Law Association 
could not come to an agreement on the definition of aggressive 
33 
war. Almost any definition can have an exception. If you 
define "aggressive war" as the first country to physically attack 
another having initiated an "aggressive war," questions soon 
arise. Assume there is a situation where country A is massing 
troops on the border with country B. B then attacks A before 
A crosses the border with the reasoning that A was going to 
attack so they were simply acting in self-defense. Yet, 
according to our previous definition, B was the aggressor. 
If we define "aggressive war" as the war started by the 
aggressive moves of one nation, who is to be the judge as to 
what is an aggressive move? "Aggressive war" is a very ambiguous 
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term that was never spelled out by the prosecution or the 
Tribunal. IIPerhaps at the present stage of the International 
Society the word 'aggressors' is essentially 'chameleonic' and 
may only mean the leaders of the losing party,1I was Pal's 
response to the definition of lIaggressive war. 1I34 
The proponents of the idea that aggressive war was a crime 
pointed to the Pact of Paris in 1928 as their main piece of 
evidence. This was a treaty signed by more than sixty nations, 
including Germany and Japan. The relevant part of the Pact 
reads: 
Convinced that all changes in their relations with 
one another should be sought only by pacific means 
and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, 
and that any signatory power which shall hereafter 
seek to promote its national interest by resort of 
war, should be denied the benefits furnished by this 
treaty. 35 
The Pact did not prohibit nations to act in self-defense. This 
is where a conflict arises, since it was not spelled out what 
constituted self-defense. Each country was left to its own 
definition of self-defense. 
That last detail is important: each country was left to 
its own definition of self-defense. The significance of that 
statement is that there was no consensus of what constituted 
self-defense and where the line was drawn between that and 
aggressive war. Frank Kellogg, Secretary of State from 1925 
to 1929 and one of the chief negotiators of the treaty for the 
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u.s., stated in an address to Congress that self-defense was 
not contained strictly to "defense of territory under the 
sovereignty of the state concerned.,,36 This meant that there 
were other considerations to be taken into account besides the 
simple case of one nation physically attacking another. Those 
considerations may have taken the form of blockades, embargoes, 
or even veiled threats or preparations for war. IT WAS UP TO 
EACH NATION TO DECIDE. For all that is known, the leaders of 
Japan may have believed the propaganda they released that said 
they were acting not only in self-defense, but also in 
self-preservation. Pal pointed out that Pearl Harbor must be 
looked at from the Japanese point of view and in light of the 
fact that the u.s. was giving China all the possible aid that 
it could. 37 
The claim of self-defense is not the only factor in the 
view of the legality of war. The belief that international 
law was produced by the Pact of Paris was disputed by the 
defense. The wording of the Pact seems to contradict the notion 
that it was accepted as international law. If the signatories 
had wanted to consent to the outlawing of aggressive war, it 
seems logical that they would have explicitly declared this 
in the Pact with wording similar to "promoting national interests 
by resort of war is an international crime." The signatories 
instead decided to agree that if they did resort to war for 
national interests, they would be "denied the benefits furnished 
by this treaty." 
Weiss 18 
Instead of creating international law, the Pact of Paris 
was, in reality, a contractual agreement, and the law of 
contracts is completely different than criminal law. Contractual 
law does not require punishment for breaking of a contract. 
Rather, it requires the reparations for the damages i.n breaking 
the contract, but that was not the object of the Tribunal. 
Since the Pact formed a contractual obligation and di.d not form 
law, the Japanese were not guilty of international crimes for 
aggressive war under the Pact of Paris. 
Two other facts supported the idea that the Pact did not 
make international law. Kellogg, in his notes with the Pact, 
stipulated that if one of the signatory nations brokE! the treaty, 
the others were released from their obligation as stated in 
38 the treaty. Another example was a message given to Congress 
on September 21, 1939, by President Roosevelt. In that address 
he asked for repeal of the Neutrality act of 1937, which put 
an embargo on arms to all belligerents. He wanted to return 
"to the historic foreign policy of the u.S. based on ••• the 
age-old doctrine of international law • • • and on the solid 
footing of real and traditional neutrality" which in his view 
"recognizes the cause of both parties to the contest as 
just--that is it avoids all considerations of the merits of 
the contest.,,39 This message shows the President of the U.S. 
had little regard as to who was "right" in a war. If there 
indeed was international law in 1939 outlawing war, as the 
prosecution suggests, it would be imperative that at most the 
u.S. should aid the aggrieved nation, and at least the U.S. 
---------------
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should not aid the aggressor in its war. Pal says: 
• • • in light of this legislative history of the 
official attitude of the government of the U.S. toward 
the interpretations of the Pact, it is impossible 
to accept the thesis that a war in violation of the 
Pact was illegal in international law on September 
21, 1939. 40 
If the Pact of Paris did not constitute international law, 
the prosecution argued that the Pact pointed to customary law, 
which is unwritten but accepted law, making war illegal. There 
were several problems with that theory. First, if according 
to the pact, each nation could decide what it deemed self-defense 
and was then free to exercise their military might, there existed 
no consensus as to what was considered illegal. For customary 
law to be recognized, there must be a consensus, and that was 
obviously not present if there was not even an agreement on 
a definition of aggression. Kellogg's notion that if one country 
broke the treaty the rest were released also went against the 
idea of customary law being present. Pal observed, " ••• and 
treaties of nonaggression that are flagrantly disregarded when 
it becomes expedient to do so cannot be relied upon as evidence 
to prove the EVOLUTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM OUTLAWING 
AGGRESSION. 1141 
For there to be customary law, people must not only be 
conscious of the law, but they must live by that law. If there 
was no recongition of the law, the law could not have existed 
as a customary law. The premise implied that customary law 
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was not observed at the time and can be shown with several 
examples. The most obvious of these were the attacks of the 
Germans and the Japanese, but there were also others. There 
were hostilities between the Soviet Union and China in 1929. 
Several years later, Italy invaded Ethiopia and the Soviet Union 
invaded Finland. Even after the Tribunal supposedly settled 
the question of the legality or illegality of war, there have 
been and continue to be wars in large numbers. There was no 
customary law present at the time of World War Two. 
with the Tribunal's assumption that Japan's aggression 
was indeed illegal, there was also the assumption that 
individuals could be prosecuted for acts of state. customary 
law in this situation can be ruled out since there were no 
precedents at the time of the trial. Even Kaiser Wilhelm II 
was not punished personally by the international community for 
instigating World War One. 
There are two reasons individuals were not held responsible 
for the acts of state before World War Two. First, the head 
of state is merely acting as the instrument of the people of 
his country. He is doing the will of the people, and the 
responsibility of the act is on the people as a whole, not the 
individual. Without this understanding, there would be no 
responsibility of the state for any of its actions. On the 
contrary, all of its actions could be accredited to individuals. 
The second reason is that punishment or retribution by an 
aggrieved nation could be easily circumvented by a shrewd nation. 
If a certain action was thought to be illegal in international 
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law, the country that was guilty of the wrong could simply take 
it upon itself to punish one or more scapegoats who were said 
to be responsible. They could then say that the injustice was 
settled, thus allowing the nation at fault to escape any 
42 penalties such as reparations or embargoes. 
At the time, the sovereignty of each nation was the highest 
authority in disputes. There was no higher government or 
organization since the United Nations was just being formed. 
Professor Hans Kelsen of the University of California said: 
If individuals shall be punished for acts which they 
have performed as acts of state, by a court of another 
state, or by an international tribunal, the legal 
basis of the trial, as a rule, must be an international 
treaty concluded with the state whose acts shall be 
punished, by which treaty jurisdiction over these 
individuals is conferred upon the national or 
international court. 43 
Pal concurred with Kelsen and felt that "acts done while working 
a national constitution" should not corne under the jurisdiction 
of international law as long as the nation-state was the highest 
th . t' . t 44 au orl y ln SOCle y. 
Added to the ruling of law, on the basis of what was 
accepted at the time, was the pragmatic aspects of the situation. 
It would be very easy to prosecute the cases of individuals 
if it was clear which individuals were responsible for each 
crime. In the Japanese government in the period covered by 
the indictment, the lines of authority were very confusing. 
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Every Japanese was supposedly answerable to the emperor, but 
Hirohito's role in the war remained very obscure. Even when 
a government position seemed to have the authority to carry 
out different orders and actions, the reality may have been 
that another position or person held the power. One would assume 
that in the Japanese cabinet the premier was the most powerful 
person, but in several periods before Tojo became the premier 
the war minister was the most influential person in the cabinet. 
If the army decided not to appoint a war minister they could 
prevent the forming of a new government. They could also bring 
down the current cabinet by telling the war minister to resign. 
The war minister also had direct access to the emperor. In 
one exchange at the Tribunal Hugh Helm asked Baron Kijuro 
Shidehara, "These instructions were issued to General Minami?" 
Shidehara replied, "The cabinet had no authority to give orders 
to the war minister," and later "The cabinet was not in a 
position to discipline either the army in Manchuria or any army 
45 
anywhere." One of the most powerful men in Japan in the 1930s 
and early 1940s was Dr. Okawa, yet he held no government office 
or military rank. 
In addition to the confused system of power, there was 
the fact that extreme pressure was put on people in positions 
of power who did not fully agree with the war hawks. There 
were assassinations of two premiers, Osachi Hamaguchi and 
Tsuyoshi Inukai, and the attempt to assassinate others in power 
including premiers, generals, and admirals. 46 Many Japanese 
were personally against the war, but carried out their jobs 
-----,-_.----------
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without protest because of their sense of duty to thE~ir country 
or fear for their lives. 
Another law imposed on the Tribunal by the Charter was 
that individuals were responsible for acts of state. There 
is no precedent for the punishment of individuals for acts of 
state. There is also the practicality of measuring out judgment 
to those involved. There was no treaty in place stating that 
individuals could be tried, either. In respect to those facts, 
the Tribunal erred in holding individuals responsible. 
In light of the preceding facts on both aggressive war 
and individual responsibility for acts of state, the conclusion 
that the Allies were guilty of enforcing ex post facto law is 
clear. Ex post facto law is law that was enacted after the 
fact, but is still applied to the people that committed acts 
before they were declared illegal. Almost all systems of law 
did not allow ex post facto legislation, at least in theory. 
The Soviet system was an exception and will be discussed later. 
The Allies made the decision that aggressive war was illegal 
and stated so in the Charter of the Tribunal. There was debate 
on the subject in the trial, with at least one justice saying 
that the Tribunal could judge whether or not the Charter 
represented international law, but a majority of the Tribunal 
thought it was obligated to rule according to the Charter that 
formed it.47 This ruling was similar to the interpretation 
of the rules of evidence, yet the injustice was greater when 
dealing with the question of the legality of war. To 
retroactively create a law against a nation or individual which 
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thought its actions to be within the bounds of international 
law certainly is in the realm of vengeance and not justice. 
The same can be said for the prosecution of individuals 
for starting the war. There were no precedents for this. There 
were no treaties establishing the responsibility of individuals 
for acts of war. The Japanese signed the instrument of surrender 
which included a statement that all war criminals would be 
punished and the new government of Japan would assist in this 
process. Keenan used this as an argument that the Japanese 
agreed to the Tribunal and the interpretations of the law that 
the Allies had been proclaiming since they decided to prosecute 
the leaders of the Axis countries. 48 In signing the surrender 
papers, however, the Japanese were not agreeing to anything 
more than the stopping of the destruction of their country. 
Their situation was similar to the bully who twists a kid's 
arm until the kid hands over his milk money and later the bully 
argues that the kid willingly gave it to him. The Japanese 
had no choice. After the first atomic bomb was dropped, Japan 
was told to stop fighting or their country would "face utter 
destruction."49 The surrender of Japan was an unconditional 
surrender, which means literally no conditions were put on the 
Allies. The Japanese were under the control of the Allies and 
would get whatever the grace of the victors allowed. The 
Japanese did not agree to the trial, the rulings of the Tribunal, 
or the command of MacArthur as Supreme Commander. Rather, they 
endured the trial and the occupation of their country. 
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Another travesty of the trial was that the only people 
on trial were Japanese. The Charter does not state that only 
Japanese could be indicted, but the prosecution was run by the 
Allies and the governments of the eleven nations told their 
representatives on the prosecution staff whom they wanted 
charged. The Allies would certainly not indict any of their 
own people, but the Allies also had an attitude of moral 
superiority about them. They never considered that they might 
have broken laws, too. They were the ones fighting on the side 
of "good" and the Axis powers were on the side of "evil." All 
of the Allies' acts had been done to stop the violent war machine 
of Japan, so it made the acts acceptable. Yet several actions 
taken by the Allies would have been brought before the Tribunal 
if the Japanese had participated in them. 
The examination of the behavior of the Allies is not meant 
to pardon all of the actions of the Japanese by pointing the 
finger at someone else. The reason for examining them is to 
show that the trial was meant as a measure of vengeance and 
punishment and not as a means to promote justice in the world. 
If justice was truly sought, there would have been sE!veral other 
nationalities on trial as well, including Americans, Dutch, 
French, and Russians. 
Not only should there have been others on trial, but nations 
with representatives sitting on the bench would be among the 
accused. Were those nations then in a position to judge the 
actions of Japan? Obviously, that would be like the inmates 
running the asylum, or in this case the prison. 
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Those cases will be examined in comparison to Japanese 
actions of the same type. First, Japanese conquest in general, 
and most blatantly in China, was regarded as imperialist in 
nature and illegal. The same imperialistic conduct was being 
perpetrated by the nations of France and the Netherlands at 
the same time the trial was progressing. The French were 
fighting for what they claimed was rightfully theirs in 
Indochina. After the Japanese were defeated, Indochina declared 
its independence, but the French did not recognize it. 50 Under 
the conditions specified in the Charter, the French vlere guilty 
of an illegal war. The Dutch were also carrying on the same 
b h · . I d . 51 e aVlor ln n oneSla. These two countries had economic 
interests in these lands and did not want to let them go after 
they had been forced out by the Japanese, but that argument 
had similar undertones to reasons for the control of Manchuria 
by the Japanese. 
The notion that the Soviets could sit in judgment over 
the Japanese for war crimes was deplorable, considering the 
Soviets' actions during World War TWO. In its dealings strictly 
with Japan, the Soviet Union did EXACTLY what Japan had done. 
The Japanese and the Soviets had signed a non-aggression pact 
that was to expire in April 1946. This was beneficial to both 
countries because they would not have to worry about another 
front in the war. The Japanese concentrated on the Chinese 
and Pacific fronts until the Soviets did not have to worry about 
the Germans any longer. After the defeat of Germany, the Soviets 
found it more beneficial to disregard their pact with the 
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Japanese and declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945. Not only 
did the Soviet Union break its treaty with Japan, it also 
ignored pleas by the Japanese for the Soviets, as a neutral 
party to the war between the U.S. and Japan, to talk to the 
52 U.S. about surrender terms. These attempts at establishing 
a dialogue to end the war could have shortened the conflict. 
The Soviets abused their position as an intermediary for the 
Japanese simply because they stood to gain land if they declared 
war on Japan. 
In their dealings with Europe, the Soviet Union's moral 
foundation is shown to have no foundation at all. First they 
made a deal with Hitler to split up Poland. They profited from 
this pact and also from their attack of Finland. Their prize 
was soon taken away from them when the Germans attacked them. 
Suddenly, the Soviets were on the side of the Allies, who soon 
forgot that earlier the Soviets were helping the Germans and 
had openly moved into Finland and Poland. Soon after the end 
of the war, the Soviets controlled the eastern half of Europe, 
which was similar to the puppet regimes in Manchuria. 
The Soviet Union was also responsible for indiscriminately 
getting rid of people in their own country under the disguise 
of the law. Stalin's purge trials were notorious for their 
swiftness and harshness. The Soviet Justice Zarayanov complained 
at the trial, liThe major Japanese war criminals will die a 
natural death long before the International Military Tribunal 
passes its verdict." 53 Many people don't remember that the 
Soviet Union was as anti-Semitic as Germany, possibly because 
"---------
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the Soviets did not lose a war and were not put on trial for 
all the world to see. Despite their authoritarian system of 
justice, they were still allowed to sit on the court that tried 
th . . I 54 e Japanese war crlmlna s. This must have seemed like a 
slap in the face to the Japanese. 
The trial was probably satisfying for the U.S. more than 
any other country at the Tribunal, with the exception of China. 
It had been almost exclusively the effort of the U.S. which 
pushed the Japanese back to their homeland with the rallying 
cry "Remember Pearl Harbor!" but the Americans were also guilty 
of war crimes, if the same rules that applied to the Japanese 
applied to everyone. 
The Tribunal had charged the Japanese with the slaughter 
of innocent civilians and many horrors were documented during 
the trial, but the Americans killed many civilians in the course 
of the war, too. During the war, bombing by the Americans was 
usually confined to military or industrial targets, ones that 
had a direct affect on the war. Late in the war, however, the 
strategy of the Americans became mass bombing by squadrons of 
the new bomber, the B-29 Superfortress. General Curtis LeMay, 
hoping to speed the end of the war, decided to fire-bomb Tokyo 
with incendiary bombs that would set the city on fire. That 
strategy was a success in that large parts of Tokyo were burned 
to the ground, but more lives were lost in those bombings than 
in the two atomic bombings and almost one million people were 
homeless. 55 Although damage to strategic points was achieved, 
thousands of innocent civilians were killed in those fires. 
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General LeMay's policy was a policy of "scorched eart.h," the 
very strategy the Allies were condemning at the trial. 
The "scorched earth" policy was continued with the dropping 
of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. l 'he damage 
done to thousands of people is hard to estimate. At least 
111,000 people died directly in those two blasts. 56 Thousands 
suffered the effects of radiation before they died miserably. 
Thousands more received enough radiation to make them sick, 
but not to kill them. They went on with their lives and many 
died later with cancer. Thousands of innocent people~ were maimed 
and killed. The effects of the bombs can be summed up by an 
entry in the diary of Professor Raisuke Shirabe of the Nagasaki 
Medical College: 
August 11. Two days have passed since the big bomb 
was dropped on us, and I still can find no explanation 
as to why people continue to die. Many of them have 
no visible injuries, yet most exhibit the same 
symptoms: bleeding from the gums, loss of appetite, 
fever, apathy, the beginning of loss of hair, bloody 
diarrhea--then death. 57 
The Americans justified their use of the atomic bombs by saying 
they were trying to end the war sooner, but that is no excuse. 
There certainly were no excuses for Japan. The Americans knew 
they were wrong, too. They censored all Japanese newspapers 
and magazines and would not let them print pictures of the damage 
that the bombs caused. Not until the end of the occupation 
were the pictures published in Japan. 58 
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Those examples show that the Japanese were not alone in 
their alleged illegal acts. The idea that four nations that 
also behaved in the same manner as the Japanese were sitting 
in judgment of the Japanese was unjust and seemed to be a 
principle of Machiavellian politics. Once again Palls definition 
of lIaggressorsll as the losing party fits the situation. 
As the trial came to a close, it was obvious from the 
Tribunalls interpretation of international law and the evidence 
presented before it, the verdict would be IIguiltyll for most 
of the defendants. Seven were sentenced to death. Sixteen 
received life sentences. One received a twenty year sentence 
and another received a seven year sentence. Two defendants 
died during the proceedings and Dr. Okawa was deemed unfit for 
t . I 59 rla • 
There were several differing opinions in the Tribunal about 
the sentences handed out. In most cases there was at: least 
one justice that wanted a more severe punishment, except in 
the case of a death sentence, and at least one that wanted a 
less severe sentence. The sentences were decided by majority 
vote. For an accused to be sentenced to death, only six of 
eleven votes were needed. In the cases where there was a death 
sentence, six of them were seven to four votes and one was six 
to f · 60 lve. An issue as important as a death sentence should 
at least be decided by a vote of two thirds or more, which would 
mean eight votes in the case of eleven justices, and not merely 
a majority. In the case of Baron Koki Hirota, who was sentenced 
to death by a six to five vote, the Dutch justice, B.V. Roling, 
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thought he should have been acquitted and said, "A tribunal 
should be very careful in holding civil government officials 
responsible for the behavior of the army in the field.,,61 Roling 
also thought Marquis Koichi Kido should have been acquitted 
instead of receiving a life sentence. Pal went so far as to 
say that he found all the defendants not guilty. His reasoning 
was that war was not made illegal by the Pact of Paris or by 
customary law and individuals should not be responsible for 
acts of state. He also cited the procedural deficiencies of 
th . b I ft· h' .. 62 e Tr1 una as a ac or 1n 1S op1n10n. Henri Bernard, the 
French justice, also felt that there were faulty procedures 
and rules at the Tribunal and concluded, "A verdict reached 
by a tribunal after a defective procedure cannot be a valid 
one.,,63 Several justices also questioned the absencE! of the 
emperor and thought he should have been indicted, also. So 
even the justices on the Tribunal had widely differing opinions 
on the charges and the sentences. 
After viewing the preceding examples, the conclusion should 
be that the Japanese defendants did not receive a fair trial 
at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The 
composition of the justices on the Tribunal was not fair, and 
was biased in favor of the prosecution. The rules of the 
Tribunal, particularly regarding the admittance of evidence, 
were skewed to favor the prosecution, too. There were many 
Japanese who should have been on trial but were not for various 
reasons. Finally the defense was severely hampered by lack 
of time and manpower. 
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In the actual dispute over the law, the victors' views 
of international law were imposed on the Tribunal, and therefore 
on the defendants. The Pact of Paris was taken as creating 
international law when it really was just a contractual agreement 
between nations. There was no customary law that was developed 
by the nations of the world, which could be observed by the 
wars that were taking place, yet the prosecution and Tribunal 
asserted that there was customary law. Also, despite having 
no precedents, individuals were held responsible for carrying 
out acts of state. Lastly, since the Tribunal had the biased 
perception that there was international law outlawing Japan's 
actions, it felt that there was no practicing of ex post facto 
law. 
The disagreement of whether or not any other nation 
committed war crimes was said to be of no importance, even though 
those nations sat on the bench at the Tribunal. There were 
acts that would have been construed as crimes if the Japanese 
had done them, but since they were committed by the ~7inning 
side, they were accepted as necessary for victory. ~l greivous 
double standard was established by excluding other nations from 
the crimes they committed during the war. 
What was touted as one of the most important trials in 
history ended up being a miscarriage of justice. The Japanese 
may have been guilty of some of the charges brought against 
them, but their punishment was more for revenge than for "the 
cause of peace and right notions of international law." 
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